While the climate change conference in Copenhagen did not produce a binding treaty with targets and timetables for emissions reductions, the Copenhagen Accord did afªrm that programs to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation and enhance forest carbon stocks (REDDϩ) will move forward. 1 Although many questions still remain about program design and funding, REDDϩ mechanisms are expected to employ results-based approaches, where developed countries pay developing countries for reductions in forest loss rates below an established baseline and/or increases in forest carbon stocks. A signiªcant share of global greenhouse gas emissions comes from forest loss in developing countries (between 12 and 17 percent 2 ), and economic models project that these emissions can be reduced at a lower cost than emissions reductions in other sectors in developed countries. 3
bon Partnership Facility (FCPF) activities, the FCPF is paying increasing attention to the needs of indigenous and other forest-dependent peoples. 5 Both the draft UNFCCC REDDϩ negotiating texts produced at Copenhagen and the forest carbon sections of the draft climate bills introduced in the US Congress in 2009, include references to the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities and their participation in REDDϩ programs. 6 But what are the speciªc social protection policies that can be applied to safeguard the welfare of rural communities while reducing forest loss and enhancing forest carbon stores? Policymakers, donors, and certiªcation standards are already developing social safeguards for national and sub-national REDDϩ, yet they have little academic research to draw upon as they forge ahead. While there have been several papers published in academic journals on the complexities of establishing deforestation reference levels 7 and the implications of REDDϩ for biodiversity, 8 the topic of social safeguard policies has received scant attention.
We posit that in order for REDDϩ programs to realize positive impacts on both people and forests, social safeguard policies will need to overcome the signiªcant barriers posed by ambiguous property rights and weak governance and create ªve important institutional conditions. In this article we (1) delineate these ªve institutional conditions and explain why we believe their interaction should lead to positive impacts; (2) outline policies designed to produce these institutional conditions; and ªnally, (3) identify where further research is needed to understand the causal mechanisms (policies and institutions) responsible for positive socio-economic and ecological impacts in REDDϩ regimes.
Role of Rural Populations in Conserving and Restoring Forests and Barriers to Their Engagement
We begin by arguing that positive social impacts in REDDϩ should not just be viewed as ancillary "co-beneªts" (as often framed). 9 Rather, avoiding negative impacts on rural communities and promoting their positive engagement may be integral to the overall effectiveness of REDDϩ programs. A growing body of research ªnds that local communities can be effective conservation agents when they have secure tenure. 10 Clear resource rights encourage sustainable use and empower forest users with the legal authority to block illegal exploitation by Griscom et al. 2009. 8 . For example, see Grainger et al. 2009 . 9. See Brown et al. 2008 . 10. Chhatre and Agrawal 2009 outsiders. But even where communities' tenure rights are clear, if they lack economic incentives for conservation, then risks of these forests being cleared will remain. 11 While it is important to note that small-scale agriculture and fuelwood collection are not the primary drivers in those landscapes experiencing high rates of deforestation, 12 population growth will amplify the aggregate impact of small-scale activities. Further, if citizens observe their governments (or project developers) collecting large sums of forest carbon revenues but ªnd that their own lives are not improving, resentment and opposition could ensue. Such occurrences have plagued projects in the extractive industries, and analysis of these cases (e.g., gold mines in Cajamarca, Peru) demonstrates the ªnancial costs of not ensuring local community support. 13 In order to be positively engaged in REDDϩ, rural populations require secure tenure, economic incentives for conservation, and the opportunity to participate in program design and implementation. Yet this is where REDDϩ programs and rural communities face signiªcant barriers. First, property rights are often insecure, with customary resource rights not codiªed in law and the majority of forest area in most developing countries legally owned by the state (see Figure 1 ). Second, many of the countries with REDDϩ potential rank low on governance indicators. 14 As a result, citizens may have limited opportunity to participate in forest and revenue management decisions or to seek recourse through judicial systems. Corruption may also preclude compensation and beneªts from trickling down to local actors. 15 Where these barriers are present, risks of REDDϩ programs negatively impacting rural communities may be high.
Because these barriers are with states at the national-level and in many cases require challenging the vested interests of politically powerful elites, overcoming these barriers is likely to require that external agents (e.g., donors, offset buyers, and certiªcation standards) exert pressure or offer rewards to incentivize deep institutional reforms. At one end are certiªcation standards, such as the REDDϩ national and sub-national standard being developed by the Community, Climate, and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) and CARE, 16 which envisions that countries will voluntarily adopt the standard's social and biodiversity protection policies to attract more forest carbon investment and donor funds to their countries. At the other end are demand-side approaches, where bilateral and multilateral donors and/or developed countries buying offsets, make transfer of REDDϩ funds or payments conditional on adherence to social protection policies.
What Institutional Conditions and Policies Might Safeguard Welfare?
We now outline the ªve institutional conditions that must be met for REDDϩ to positively impact people and forests, and discuss policies that could be applied by external agents to encourage development of these conditions. Throughout, we emphasize why each condition is necessary but alone, insufªcient, in order to show why all ªve conditions are likely necessary. We also highlight particular gaps in knowledge that could beneªt from further research.
Institutional Condition 1: Local Community Support for REDD Projects
Projects that are implemented with the support of local communities should yield better welfare and forest outcomes. But what policies could certiªcation standards, donors, or offset buyers apply to ensure and verify that REDDϩ projects are implemented with the support of local communities? The most recog-nized option is a policy termed "Free, Prior, and Informed Consent" (FPIC). While requiring the FPIC of affected communities for activities on or resettlement from their lands could help to address many of the risks presented by sitespeciªc REDDϩ projects (e.g., economic or physical displacement due to protected area establishment), many questions remain regarding its implementation. First, metrics for determining what constitutes "consent" are not well deªned. 17 Second, establishing who constitutes the "community" can be complicated. Third, when should REDDϩ projects begin consultations in order for any expressed support to be truly "prior" (e.g., during project scoping or before government approval)? Early REDDϩ projects will need to be carefully evaluated to develop lessons learned. Immediate lessons can also be drawn from the World Bank Group's initial experience with their new policy of "Free, Prior, and Informed Consultation leading to Broad Community Support" (which is applied to projects with a high risk of negative social or environmental impacts).
Application of a "local community support" policy alone, however, will likely be insufªcient. Additional policies will need to create conditions that allow for the resolution of disputes within communities, since "community support" does not negate the possibility of community elites capturing beneªts and decision-making authority at the expense of marginalized individuals. Further, it may be unclear whether and how a "local community support" policy would be triggered during national reforms to forest zoning or property rights. This is of fundamental importance, since (1) the absence of legal title to their customary lands could complicate the ability of many communities to assert the right to FPIC 18 and (2) states may de-couple forest carbon rights from land rights (just as sub-surface mineral rights are de-coupled from land rights in many countries).
Institutional Condition 2: Citizen Participation in Reforms Affecting Property Rights and Land Use
Requiring citizen participation in reforms affecting property rights and land use zoning could help address risks presented by national-level decisions to increase enforcement on state-owned lands and solidify and expand state ownership of forests 19 and forest carbon. These reforms could limit rural communities' access to resources they have traditionally relied upon, maintain and increase the insecurity of their land tenure, and deny them the opportunity to economically beneªt from new forest carbon regimes. Requiring citizen participation in Kathleen Lawlor, Erika Weinthal, and all such policy reforms could promote the securitization of land and forest carbon rights for poor and politically marginalized people. 20 We acknowledge that there is an active debate amongst scholars regarding the merits of promoting "participation" as a way to rectify social injustices and advance sustainable development. 21 We argue, however, that the problem is not that the concept of participation is a bad one; the problem is that when social protection efforts focus solely on participation processes and do not also (1) require local support, (2) disclose information about project costs and beneªts, (3) provide citizens with means of recourse, and (4) evaluate welfare impacts, states and project developers can simply go through the motions, holding consultations that do not allow for the informed and meaningful participation of citizens, or exhaust affected communities with endless meetings of little consequence. This is why we argue that ensuring meaningful citizen participation in property rights and land zoning reforms is only one of ªve enabling conditions for positive welfare outcomes and how well this condition is actually met will be inºuenced by the policies used to operationalize it.
Case study evidence suggests a few policy options for ensuring meaningful citizen participation in land reforms, but more rigorous analyses of how these policies produce participation and whether this participation leads to positive welfare outcomes is needed. One option is to require that states conduct, disclose, and involve citizens in Strategic Environmental and Social Impact Assessments 22 for all land use and property rights reforms and REDDϩ plans. Another option is to require that property rights reforms are informed by participatory mapping and undertaken at local levels. Undertaking land-titling exercises at the local (rather than national) level can allow for greater citizen input to these reforms. For example, a recent review of land titling systems in Africa found that undertaking such exercises at a national level can be slow, costly, and result in unjust and contested outcomes; using local institutions that build on customary rights and employ simple registration procedures was found to be more effective and cost-efªcient. 23 However, land titling can cause disputes between land users, 24 and providing land users with secure property rights but no economic incentives for conservation could lead to forest loss. Therefore, additional policies need to address dispute resolution and beneªt ºows.
Institutional Condition 3: Transparent Management of Forest Carbon Revenues
Ensuring that forest carbon revenues are managed in a transparent manner could help address risks of compensation and beneªts not trickling down to ru-ral communities due to interception by state elites. Numerous scholars have hypothesized that when there is transparent management of commodity revenues, citizens can hold their governments accountable and encourage equitable sharing of costs and beneªts. 25 Revenue transparency mechanisms are increasingly being applied in the extractive industries to address the problem of the "resource curse" observed in many mineral-rich countries. Examples include natural resource funds, which establish clear guidelines for what the revenues can be spent on along with citizen and/or parliamentary oversight boards. 26 Another option is to require that contracts with, and payments to, governments be disclosed by both those extending and receiving the payments and that there be independent and publicly-disclosed ªnancial audits of government revenues. The US Congress, for example, passed legislation in 2006, which requires large extractive industry projects receiving ªnancial support from the World Bank Group to make such disclosures. 27
Institutional Condition 4: Citizen Access to Grievance Mechanisms
Even with the application of numerous safeguard policies, risks of negative impacts always remain. For example, there could be elite capture of forest carbon beneªts at the village level; individuals may wish to challenge a FPIC determination; participants in a conservation payment program might ªnd that their opportunity costs were under-estimated; and property rights designations could produce contested claims to the resource. Further, policies are not always implemented as designed. For all these reasons, citizens require means of recourse. Because judicial systems are weak in many countries, external agents could establish grievance mechanisms for REDDϩ programs.
Examples include the World Bank Group's Inspection Panel and Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO). Both grievance mechanisms allow projectaffected people to register claims of environmental and social harm, though their approaches differ. In order for a complaint to be eligible for investigation by the Inspection Panel, a project must be underway and speciªc policy violations must be cited. The CAO, on the other hand, maintains looser requirements to make the mechanism more accessible to the target population and so that complaints can be ªled before harm actually occurs. 28 And while Inspection Panel investigations focus on questions of policy compliance, the CAO (initially) takes a conºict resolution approach. Kathleen Lawlor, Erika Weinthal, and Lydia Olander • 7 25. Humphreys et al. 2007 . 26. Weinthal and Luong 2006 . 27. US House of Representatives 2006 . 28. CAO 2009 
Institutional Condition 5: Opportunities for Adaptive Management Through Evaluation
Too often, we know very little about the net impacts of conservation programs on human welfare and ecosystem services. 29 This lack of knowledge constrains programs' ability to engage in adaptive management. But if REDDϩ national programs conduct rigorous impact evaluations on a small sample of projects and sites to assess impacts on rural citizens, then we can uncover where interventions need to be re-tooled to correct negative impacts and where there is evidence of positive impacts-which programs can use to counter spurious allegations of harm. Most importantly, if evaluations are designed to test theories about which policies and institutional conditions produce positive impacts for people and forests in REDDϩ, then policy-makers will have the information they need to design smart social safeguard policies and scale up best practices.
The Way Forward
Ecologists and macroeconomists have led the advancement of the REDDϩ agenda into mainstream climate policy. Consequently, academic analysis of REDDϩ has tended to focus on questions of biodiversity, offset supply and cost-containment for cap-and-trade policies, and methods for measuring carbon stocks and estimating deforestation reference levels. There is growing recognition, however, that the real challenges now facing successful implementation of REDDϩ lie with governance: how to get the institutional conditions right so that those closest to forests have the proper incentives to protect them.
REDDϩ programs, however, are going forward before we have all the answers. Policy-makers will therefore need to engage with academics to ensure that a sample of early REDDϩ projects and programs are rigorously assessed using impact evaluation techniques so that we can identify the causal mechanisms leading to observed impacts on people and forests. Further, scholarship must catch up with quickly evolving events in the policy world. As Michael Ross has noted elsewhere: "If scholars wish to produce research that contributes to better policies, they must think carefully about testing their ideas . . ." 30 This means that institutionalists will need to engage with economists and anthropologists examining the welfare impacts of REDDϩ so that we can test key theories about the role of participation in conservation and development outcomes. This includes examining Amartya Sen's framework for understanding substantive freedoms as both the ends and means of development, 31 as well as recent analyses of the "tyranny of participation" critiques. 32 Emerging REDDϩ regimes provide a perfect-and critical-setting for such investigations. With meaningful collab-orations across disciplines that involve both researchers and practitioners, we may begin to understand which combination of policies yields institutional conditions that produce positive impacts for people and ecosystems-one of the most enduring and important questions in environmental policy.
